A great risk for a good cause.The Commonwealth Army in Greece, WW2

[bob10]

Or, as some would say, Churchills' folly. Go thru the chapters.

'A Great Risk' (http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/greatrisk/greatrisk.html)

[bob10]

What I found incredible was that the Menzies Australian Government had agreed to send the troops to Greece, before consulting their C.O. in the Middle East, General Blamey.[ of the Kokoda Track infamy]

"From the moment he was briefed by Wavell on 18 February, Blamey had entertained serious concern about Greece. As Australia's national commander in the field, he had the right of access to the Australian government over Wavell's head. However, it was not until 9 March 1941, by which time elements of Lustre Force were already on their way, that Blamey requested of the Minister for the Army, Percy Spender, that he might submit his views. It must have come as a shock, so late in the day, to the Australian War Cabinet to learn that Blamey did not think the expedition had 'a reasonable chance of success'. While the British could muster three divisions and an armoured brigade, against them, Blamey advised, the Germans had 'as many divisions available as roads can carry' and 'within three to four months we must be prepared to meet overwhelming forces completely equipped and trained'. His conclusion was simple:

Military operation extremely hazardous in view of the disparity between opposing forces in number and training.
[Blamey, quoted in Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p.17]

Thus did the AIF set out for Greece with the agreement of the Australian government and towards what its commander, who arrived there on 18 March, thought could be disaster."

[bob10]

A great risk indeed.

"Should the British force and its Australian contingent have been sent to Greece to face the German Army at the height of its power during World War II? Many of the soldiers who fought there felt some bitterness towards those who they saw as responsible for the decision and for the failure to adequately equip the force, especially in relation to armour and air power. Against the pitifully few RAF squadrons, amounting to just 80 serviceable aircraft, the German and Italian air forces combined were able to put into the air over 1100 planes. The commander of the British 1st Armoured Brigade in Greece, Brigadier H V S Charrington, wrote upon his return to Egypt:

There will I fear be a lot of muck dragged up over the whole expedition ? the Australians (with some justice) demand a full enquiry as to why the promised air support they had insisted upon before allowing their troops to participate was not forth-coming ? I don't know whether they could have spared more aeroplanes but the Australians are terribly bitter about it."