Airbus crashes in Pakistan " we have lost engines"

[bob10]

Couldn't lower their undercarriage, went around, lost both engines." According to Aviation officials. "


Few survivors found after Pakistan airbus crashes into homes (https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/world/2020/05/23/pakistan-plane-crash/?utm_source=Adestra&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Saturday%20News%20-%2020200523)

[Tins]

Gear looks down to me.... [EDIT] the video is from the 2nd landing attempt.


https://youtu.be/AwfkN5M-bSY

[JDNSW]

Sounds pretty clearcut - except for the "minor" question of how did an experienced airline crew manage to actually touch down with gear not extended? Other question of course is why did it not extend?

[Tins]

https://youtu.be/xfzwYKGLNnY

[Tins]

https://youtu.be/uA5PF3JMHdo

[Tins]

Sympathies to the souls lost, and to their loved ones.

[Tins]

https://youtu.be/EFhGnCOtcc8

[Tins]

https://youtu.be/OZ0LY7ma1cA

[Hugh Jars]

So it appears the aircraft was not stable with gear down on the first approach (1000' agl callout "stable" or "not stable"). I don't know about the A320's EGPWS, but I would have expected an aural "too low, gear" callout on the first approach, which would have been an immediate trigger for a go-around. I don't know if the A320 has the capability to override this callout.

Additionally, if a landing can't be made within the touchdown criteria, the pilot not flying should have called "long landing". Once again, a trigger for an immediate go-around.

[JDNSW]

All of which would seem to raise some questions about PIA training?

[Hugh Jars]

All of which would seem to raise some questions about PIA training?
Possibly, John.

I'd be keen to hear the CVR transcript. Was there a conflict between the crew? How long were they on duty prior to the prang?

I'm really puzzled as to how they missed several procedural opportunities to fix the problem.

[Hugh Jars]

The descent profile of the Pakistan aircraft is in blue. The standard descent profile is shown in orange.
161614

Rates of descent of the Pakistan aircraft based on its profile. This is scary stuff, so close to the ground...
161615

They had no chance of being stable by 1000'. Why the descent profile was like this is yet to be determined.

[JDNSW]

Yes!

[Hugh Jars]

Each operating seat had a captain in it, instead of a first officer (in the right seat). Depending on the company, was it a line captain, or a training/check captain in the right? We used to have line captains in the right seat on occasion, but (thankfully) CASA canned that a few years ago.

What effect (if any) did that have on the flight?

[JDNSW]

It could have had a major effect - like "who is flying this plane?" or "who is in charge here?".

Where did you get that bit of information?

[Hugh Jars]

It could have had a major effect - like "who is flying this plane?" or "who is in charge here?".

Where did you get that bit of information?

Through a reliable source at work.
I don’t know about Paky practices, but even if a check captain is in the right seat, the left seat captain is pilot in command at VA.
The only time the checky would assume command is if he went through the safety language (SOP breach) to the point of “captain, you must listen”. Then he would take control and command of the aircraft. The errant pilot would be stood down after landing, and investigated.
Now, these countries/cultures can have issues with assuming command over a senior crew member. Many prangs have happened because of this. Let’s say there was a checky in the right, and he was pilot flying. Did the checky deviate from SOPs? Was the line captain reluctant to call the deviation for fear of causing loss of face, or worse still, being criticised at the end of the flight?

[cjc_td5]

Viewing a couple of the blancolirio reviews of the crash, I noted that the gear fault "ding ding" warning sounded the same as the excessive airspeed or change in altitude alarm? Could be as simple as an airspeed alarm drowning out the gear alarm and them not realising until they planted their engines on the concrete?

[Hugh Jars]

It is possible, but unlikely. All aircraft that are fitted with EGPWS have an aural warning “TO LOW - GEAR!!” which sounds once the aircraft descends below a certain height above ground with the gear retracted or in an unsafe condition.
In my type, a switch can be used to override this, but only when directed by a checklist addressing a gear malfunction.
I don’t know if the A320 has a similar system. I’ll ask a friend who flies them today.

[JDNSW]

In the back of my mind is that the last words on the CVR of a Mexican airliner was "Shut up, gringo!".

[Fourgearsticks]

Was the line captain reluctant to call the deviation for fear of causing loss of face, or worse still, being criticized at the end of the flight?
This is very real, still a big factor in Asia along with corruption and nepotism.

[JDNSW]

Interestingly, although not directly comparable, in the last major air disaster in Pakistan (different airline), the CVR revealed that the high hours captain spent the flight catechising the low hours first officer and belittling him before flying into terrain in a botched attempt to land at an airport where other flight had diverted due to weather. The captain was flying and throughout the the approach the first officer was silent except for the last words - "pull up, sir". Despite the captain breaking a number of company rules.

[Hugh Jars]

This is very real, still a big factor in Asia along with corruption and nepotism.

I used to train pilot cadets from Korean Air, Malaysia Airlines, and Merpati (Garuda).
We spent a lot of our time teaching these guys how to level the cockpit gradient back towards how it is in the western world. Generally we had good success.
Unfortunately, when they went back home it was trained out of them...

[3toes]

Was not the crash of the 2 jumbos in the Canary Islands due to the captain taking off and ignoring advise of a junior pilot not to move

[JDNSW]

Was not the crash of the 2 jumbos in the Canary Islands due to the captain taking off and ignoring advise of a junior pilot not to move

From memory that may have been a factor, but no accident is "due to" a single factor.

My memory says it was a chain of events including misunderstanding of slightly ambiguous ATC directions, fog, abnormally heavy traffic for the airport requiring taxiways being used for parking, with a number of places where the chain of events could have been broken. The legal responsibility ended up with the KLM crew having initiated a takeoff under the mistaken impression that they had been cleared for takeoff, with both them and ATC using non-standard phraseology, and then several parties talking over the top of each other meaning nobody heard the protest from the PanAm pilot about the clearance.

[Hugh Jars]

The captain was the head of check and training, and was known as being an overbearing autocrat. I would hate to have been checked by him. There was a crew flight and duty time limit rapidly approaching, and the captain wanted to beat that.
He was totally fixated on departing, to the exclusion of all that was going on around him, including listening to the FO and flight engineer.

Sure, there are a plethora of other factors, but all it took was for him to listen to his crew, and that would have broken the accident chain.

[superquag]

The captain was the head of check and training, and was known as being an overbearing autocrat. I would hate to have been checked by him. There was a crew flight and duty time limit rapidly approaching, and the captain wanted to beat that.
He was totally fixated on departing, to the exclusion of all that was going on around him, including listening to the FO and flight engineer.

Sure, there are a plethora of other factors, but all it took was for him to listen to his crew, and that would have broken the accident chain.


Nicer way of saying 'Self-centred and insufferably arrogant.':bat:

I've met doctors like that. - Only once each.