QF 32-ABC 4 Corners 28th march

[Lionel]

Enjoyed greatly the 4 Corners program last Monday on the QF 32 incident. It included interviews with all the flight crew, and the cabin crew supervisor, plus some interviews with passengers. Also some useful interviews with Qantas staff and CEO, which gave a bit of opportunity to "read between the lines"!

Clearly there is disapproval with the way Rolls-Royce have handled the PR side of things, though there was no criticism of their technical response to the engine failure.

Sarah Ferguson, as one would expect from an ABC journalist, tried to imply a "cover-up" by Rolls-Royce on the oil feed pipe problem, and this is the sort of thing that Rolls-Royce could have for-stalled with a well organised PR exercise. BP's experience in the US has obviously spooked them!

It is also a pity that not a lot of effort was made to put the engine failure in context. There are many hundreds of RR RB211 (3 spool) turbofans flying around the world, and this Trent 900 (also a 3 spool turbofan) was the first case of an un-contained failure so far.

Other engine manufacturers have had such failures (GE with the early CF6's - also promptly dealt with), in some cases with loss of life. To quote a recently used phrase - sh*^t happens!

The extended interviews with Captain Richard de Crespigny and Captain Dave Evans on the 4 Corners website were even more interesting, and the whole flight deck crew deserve the highest praise, for averting what could have been a major disaster, due to their professionalism.

This was a standard of airmanship starkly in contrast to the behaviour of the two clowns flying the Emirates A340 in March 2009, when they entered the wrong weight in the computer, and tail dragged the aircraft on take-off (they got the sack very quickly!).

ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A340-541 A6-ERG Melbourne-Tullamarine Airport, VIC (MEL)

Cheers,

Lionel

[weeds]

i wanted to watch it but missed it...........

[Scouse]

i wanted to watch it but missed it...........

It was repeated last night & it should be viewable on the ABC site.

[stallie]

two clowns flying the Emirates A340 in March 2009

Lionel, that comment is completely out of line and uncalled for. Mis entry of data into takeoff computers has happened several times (yes including on Australian airlines) let alone in the middle of the night to pilots on the other side of the world on a strange time zone on bare minimum rest.

That the company changed the process by now giving each pilot a computer to separately compute the numbers and then cross check shows that it was a systematic error. This accident seems to have nothing to do with clown pilots.

I am told that the pilots were given the choice of resign with your entitlements or be fired without them which does not foster a good just safety culture...

Anyway, I suggest you read the interim report (rather than brief summaries) and then reconsider your comments, particularly the following self acknowledged company's problems:

On 17 April 2009, the aircraft operator informed the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau that based on their internal investigation the following areas were under
review:
• human factors – including review of current pre-departure, runway
performance calculation and cross-check procedures; to determine if
additional enhancement is feasible and desirable, with particular regard to
error tolerance and human factors issues.
• training – including review of the initial and recurrent training in relation to
mixed fleet flying and human factors.
• fleet technical and procedures – including introduction of a performance
calculation and verification system which will protect against single data
source entry error by allowing at least two independent calculations.
• hardware and software technology – including liaising with technology
providers regarding systems for detecting abnormal take-off performance.

With those issues, do you still blame the pilots?

[Lionel]

With those issues, do you still blame the pilots?

Yes. They were the one's that did not check the data entry properly. As far as flying in the middle of the night in another time zone, well if they weren't fit to fly they should have called in sick.

These are mistakes that should not happen, and it is good that systematic improvements have been made by the company, but ultimately the captain in command and his first officer are responsible for the safety of the aircraft and passengers.

All air incidents are caused by a chain of events, and they were the link which failed, putting the lives of several hundred passengers at risk.

Cheers,

Lionel

[p38arover]

That the company changed the process by now giving each pilot a computer to separately compute the numbers and then cross check shows that it was a systematic error. This accident seems to have nothing to do with clown pilots.

These are mistakes that should not happen, and it is good that systematic improvements have been made by the company,

I assume you both mean "systemic"?

sys·tem·ic

–adjective
1. of or pertaining to a system.
2. Physiology, Pathology . a. pertaining to or affecting the body as a whole.
b. pertaining to or affecting a particular body system.


3. (of a pesticide) absorbed and circulated by a plant or other organism so as to be lethal to pests that feed on it.

[mudmouse]

The incidents are vastly different. The QF one had the luxury of 4 type certified and experienced crew with a lot of time to study the problem(s) and act appropriately. The 2nd was a data entry error. Yes it was not picked up by cross checking, but still a very different type of incident.

Aviation, like many industries, is FULL of stuff up stories that don't go public. Those involved often driving home thinking, "Holy #### that was close".

Matt

[stallie]

Yes, the two incidents are very different. One is a well recovered situation after a catastrophic engine failure and damage, the other a human factors issue brought about by inadequate resourcing.

I raised the second as I took umbrage at Lionel's statement that the two Emirates pilots were clowns. I don't know them from a bar of soap, but a human error in a trap laid for them by the system in which they worked (fatigue, multiple fleets, no cross checking procedures) is not "clown" piloting.

The fact that they were sacked is evidence of lack of a just safety culture within the company, and must not be construed by the lay person as sole culpability in the accident.

Aviation, like many industries, is FULL of stuff up stories that don't go public. Those involved often driving home thinking, "Holy #### that was close".

Very true Mudmouse. I don't know a pilot that hasn't said that, myself included. But remember Lionel, the best companies are those that analyse the stuff ups, amend the systems and retrain staff so that they don't happen again.

As for calling in sick when fatigued, that's fanciful at best. I suggest you read the Harden Up Princess email tabled to the Senate Enquiry last month. Airline rostering practices and cultures do not tolerate pilots calling in fatigued, despite lip service to the contrary. As an aside, be aware that is a common ploy for airline managers to say that pilots only work 20 hours a week in an attempt to create the image in the public that pilots are lazy. Pilots can only fly on average 20 hours a week, but that's 20 hours of wheels off time. This does NOT include pre and post flight (around 90 mins per day) turnarounds between flights, mechanical delays, customs, positioning across the country to fly an aircraft home etc. Count that and it's rare to be working less than a 40 hour week... But I digress...

Now back to QF32 - a job well done.

[jb747]

I raised the second as I took umbrage at Lionel's statement that the two Emirates pilots were clowns. I don't know them from a bar of soap, but a human error in a trap laid for them by the system in which they worked (fatigue, multiple fleets, no cross checking procedures) is not "clown" piloting.

Data entry errors are common. Any sensible company will have a system in place to limit this sort of error. For instance with the old paper performance data it could be required that each pilot source the input data separately (i.e. listen to the ATIS, and look up the load sheet data, not listen to a number given to him by the other pilot), plus the manuals would be closed after each person used them, so each pilot would have to find the correct page himself.

It could readily be argued that the newer electronic systems are actually easier to make gross errors on. The system I use requires that we individually calculate the data, and then we compare the 'excess' runway generated. This is not a number that is normally of much use, but it is extremely sensitive to the slightest difference in data input. Separate computers are used.

The fact that they were sacked is evidence of lack of a just safety culture within the company, and must not be construed by the lay person as sole culpability in the accident.

The Emirates response to this accident was disgusting at best. They had a problem with their overall system, and their solution of firing the pilots does nothing to fix that system. But, I'd expect that they sat back and told themselves that all was well once the two pilots had gone.