Thread: The Pacific

Originally Posted by Disco44

They say in the first episode that it was the first action of Yank forces in the Pacific theatre.That is incorrect, Yank National Guardsmen fought with Aussies on Kokoda.Trouble is they were like our forces civilian volunteers,inadequately trained and armed.But for "Chockos" the originals,both Aussie & Yank rewrote the journals for a fighting retreat and held the Nip back from taking Port Moresby.This was just in time for the ninth to get there and chase the Nips right back to and eventually re-taking Rebaul.In re-taking Rabual the yanks were again used in the one and only parachute drop in the Pacific theatre,but I think that was after Guadalcanal
In all of this no thanks can be given to both the commanders in Chief..Blamey
(Australia) & MacArthur(US) They both accused the troops of cowardice..much to the chagrin of the Aussies who almost revolted when Blamey accused them in Port Moresby.( one of the few times he went near the fighting)It was only good discipline and respect for their Officers & Nco's that it never eventuated.
As for the Pacific IMHO nowhere near Band of Brothers so far after the first two episodes.

Rabual, was never retaken,

Band of Brothers was a joint HBO (USA) and BBC (UK) production. One of the main reasons given for wanting the BBC involved was their expertise in historical accuracy which they considered was not available in the USA.

Tom Hanks and Speilberg were the names behind Band of Brothers as well. Most of it was shot on the dissused De Haviland factory and associated airfield at Hatfield just north of London. It has since been redeveloped as a housing estate with little to show there was ever a factory or airfield on the sight. Developers here love airfields as they are large spaces and tend to be flat making it easy to build on. It has also resulted in a massive industry in British people dressing up as American soldiers.

Despite what some will tell you the film of Band of Brothers was not 100% accurate as they altered what happened to make a good show.

The main campaign was in New Guinea this though had to be played down for political reasons. This was the reason why Gaudicanal was given a big PR push. They needed to show the USA public that they were in the pacific war and this was the place where they were fighting despite it being a naval battle with supporting land forces. There was actually an order given by General Mcarthur that where Australian forces were fighting they were to be referred to in press releases as allied troops not Australian as other wise there was too little mention of the US troops which would reduce the support the campaign would receive from the USA. You have to remember that only the Burma campaign had a lower priority in resources than the South West Pacific which was were Australia fitted.

When speaking about New Guinea don't forget that this was the only occasion where the VDC (Volunteer Defence Corps) engaged the enemy. They were the only troops in the area and attempted to defend against the first Japanese landings which they were unlucky enough to have occur there. The survivors retreated into the mountains behind Lae where for the next few years while waiting for the rest of the army to arrive they maintained a watch on the tracks to warn if the Japanese attempted to open a new front.

For those who do not know the VDC was set up to cover those too old, too young or not able to serve in the CMF or AIF for other reasons. Think of the Home Guard of Dads Army fame. The Home Guard was set up later and based on the VDC.

Originally Posted by clean32

Rabual, was never retaken,

I may be wrong for I could not find the book from which I quoted last night.So I'll check my facts when that illusive book can be found.Thanks for your answer Mate.

We need to be careful that we don’t do the same as what we accuse others of doing. History is a funny thing and history changes with time, politics and perceptions.
For me the defense of Hong Kong and the new territories is the pinnacle of personal effort and sacrifice.
the Canadians who numbered less than 2000 and who were ordered to surrender after 17ddays were a poorly trained garrison unit who excelled in the hand to hand combat that eventuated, with there casualties at about 500 dead and 700 wounded, and the wounded being bayoneted along with the medical staff including nurses. And there commander jumping on a grenade to save others. no ammo no water. less than 50% survived the initial fighting and 20% 3 1/2 yeas as POWs.

Rather than surrender the HK volunteer force of 650 older men and younger boys, who were either WW1 vets or just untrained polo and bridge players. Armed with some military rifles but also there personal rifles shotguns and swords. After being isolated for 36 hours with no water or ammo the last surviving 38 members fixed bayonets and charged. There were no survivors, the last 36 hours of there history comes solely from the Japanese accounts.

Although these events excelled in personal endeavor and sacrifice one would think that it little effect on the pacific war as a hole.

The Japanese like the Yanks effectively had two competing forces in the pacific, marines and army. It was the Japanese marines who landed on HJK island. The sacrifice of the defenders influenced marine thinking for the remainder of the war. where the Japanese army would try and tip more recourses into an action not going in there favor the Marines would pull out, build up and have another go. You also see the marines being more kind ( relatively speaking) to civilians and surrendering allied troops.

This is very noticeable in the surrender of Singapore. personally I would argue that as the Japanese wanted to make a devastating impact with there land forces against a major power and at a major site ( ie Singapore) that if the sacrifice of the defenders of HK was not so fierce and in the words of Lieutenant General Sakai Takashi who was in command of the Japanese’s forces responsible for the taking of HK. "How many men will it take to kill a cornered dog" this message was not lossed on the attackers of Singapore. Had these events not taken place the Japanese practice/policy would have remained in place, the surrender of Singapore would not have been accepted with the result of Singapore being a major bloodbath.

Now some questions all WW2 1939 - 1946
First an easy one to put it all in context

Which country losed the most citizens?

Which county losed the larges percentage of its citizens

Which county fought both axis and allied forces

Which country had troops fighting for the allies then changed to axis and back to allies

Which country tried to declare war on America on the same day as Japan?

Apart form mainland china, where was the first Japanese solder killed in WW2

Which country had the highest percentage on there eligible Males in the forces

Which country losed the highest percentage of there male population in WW2

Which country’s fighting forces saw more days of action per percentage of force IE
number of solders. Excluding partisan actions

Which country’s forces had the highest kill ratio in ww2

Which country’s forces were ordered to not attack or antagonize the Japanese forces and to stay in barracks, but refused to do so?

Why dont you just tell us clean?

Russia.....I think.

Further on I think this is a good all round coverage....Still not able to locate my reference book..so I now think that Lae instead of Rabual should have been quoted by me.

New Guinea WW2 – A Maritime Campaign
- fuzzy-wuzzy angels - Kokoda Track - Milne Bay - Rabaul - Lae - Salamaua - Port Moresby - Japan - Battle of the Java Sea - Battle of the Sunda Strait - Battle of the Bismarck Sea - RAAF -

1942 - Papua New Guinea - Australian History

2 April 2003 Sea Power Centre Australia Main Page - Royal Australian Navy

To most Australians the campaign fought against the Japanese in New Guinea during WW2 is typified by images of Australian diggers and ‘fuzzy-wuzzy angels’ struggling along the Kokoda Track or fighting hand to hand at Milne Bay. Very few would consider this to have been a maritime campaign, yet this is exactly what it was, for the final arbiter of victory or defeat in the jungles of New Guinea was maritime power.

Following Japan’s attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, the sinking of Force Z (HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse), and the subsequent defeat of Allied naval forces in the Battles of the Java Sea and Sunda Strait, the Imperial Japanese Navy had achieved control of the seas in the South Pacific. This enabled her to project her military forces into the islands north of Australia.

By 23 January 1942 Rabaul had fallen and became the location of the Japanese forward headquarters. In order to protect Rabaul the Japanese occupied Lae and Salamaua on 8 March. However, the Japanese were soon to find that the capture of Lae did not ensure the security of Rabaul from air attacks, and they decided to capture Port Moresby by amphibious assault.

That the Japanese intended to conduct an amphibious assault on Port Moresby (Operation MO) had become known to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet through the work of USN and RAN code breakers. As a result of this intelligence Task Force 17, built around the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and USS Yorktown, was sent to the Coral Sea to engage the Japanese. Also assigned to Task Force 17 was a cruiser squadron under command of Rear Admiral J. Crace RN, which included HMAS Australia and HMAS Hobart. Prior to the battle Rear Admiral F.J. Fletcher, USN directed Admiral Crace to patrol the Jomard Passage at the eastern tip of New Guinea. The Port Moresby Invasion Force, which included the light carrier Shoho, was provided with distant cover by the aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku. As it approached the Jomard Passage the Invasion Force learnt of the presence of Admiral Crace’s cruisers and halted awaiting the outcome of the impending carrier battle further to the south. Although in the ensuing Battle of the Coral Sea the Americans lost the Lexington, the Japanese carriers were in no condition to support the further advance of the Port Moresby Invasion Force, which by this time had lost the Shoho. Rather than fight their way through the cruiser blocking force the Japanese retired to Rabaul.

Failure to take Port Moresby by amphibious assault did not deter the Japanese. They immediately commenced planning to take Port Moresby by assault from the land. This would entail a landing at Buna, which was undertaken on 21 July, and an advance across the Owen Stanley Ranges. All the logistics required by the Japanese to support this assault, and the Allies to oppose it, had to be carried by ships. So began the struggle for control of the sea-lanes.

From May 1942 Japanese submarine operations off Australia’s east coast began to take a toll on shipping. By August seven ships had been sunk and a further six damaged. Convoys were organised to protect this vital shipping and the First Naval Member was designated the Commander South West Pacific Sea Frontiers. Fortunately for the Allies the Japanese failed to allocate sufficient resources to the submarine campaign and this, coupled with a lack of strategic intelligence, ensured that losses were never of such a magnitude as to disrupt the flow of supplies north. By the end of 1943 over 60 warships were allocated for convoy escort duties. Figure 1 shows the convoy route along eastern Australia. By contrast, in the interdiction campaign against the Japanese sea lines of communications USN submarines effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant marine. An example of the fate of Japanese convoys is the January 1943 patrol by the USS Wahoo. During the course of a ten-hour running battle off New Guinea, she reported sinking an entire convoy of two Japanese freighters, one transport and one tanker.

The Japanese losses of merchant shipping ensured that only a trickle of logistics and reinforcements reached the Japanese in New Guinea. By contrast Allied forces were receiving more and more supplies and equipment. As an indication, from the opening of the campaign until September 1943 7261 vehicles, 306 guns, 596033 tons of stores, and 75 surface craft were shipped to New Guinea. By mid-1943 the Japanese attack on shipping was coming to an end as their submarines and light forces were being increasingly used to supply cut-off island garrisons. During the course of the war in excess of 1,100 coastal convoys were escorted by units of the RAN, not including a number of special convoys or troop convoys.

Air power contributed to the maritime interdiction campaign, attacking Japanese shipping, airfields and port facilities. The first Japanese defeat at Milne Bay was assisted by the destruction of an enemy convoy on 25 August 1942 by 75 Squadron RAAF. In the most notable example, intelligence warned of the last major Japanese resupply operation, a reinforcement convoy from Rabaul to Lae. Termed the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, continuous coordinated attacks by RAAF and US aircraft on 3 March 1943 resulted in the sinking of all eight transports, four out of eight destroyers, and the loss of at least one third of the Japanese troops. This action was untypical because weeks of advance warning was provided, which allowed for intensive, coordinated training and rehearsal – most shipping interdiction actions were ad hoc at short notice. From mid 1943 RAAF Catalinas mined Japanese ports, sinking or damaging 40% of all shipping entering the Balikpapan-Surabaya area.

As the Americans and Australians went over to the offensive in New Guinea the inherent advantages of sea power, in the context of flexibility and manoeuvre, became apparent. The Seventh Fleet Amphibious Force was established under command of Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, USN. From October 1942 through to July 1944 this force conducted a series of amphibious assaults from Goodenough Is in the east through to Sansapor on the western tip of New Guinea (see Figure 2). These assaults, when combined with the central Pacific advance, were a demonstration of manoeuvre warfare on a grand scale. Strong enemy forces were bypassed, whilst captured areas became advanced bases, airfields and logistic depots for the continuing maritime offensive against the Japanese. After Kokoda there were no other northern advances across New Guinea. The movement of Allied forces was in a westerly direction in a series of amphibious assaults.

RAN ships, in particular the Infantry Landing Ships HMAS Kanimbla, HMAS Westralia and HMAS Manoora, cruisers, destroyers and the Bathurst Class corvettes played an important part in the naval campaign for New Guinea providing escorts, fire support, amphibious sea lift, minesweeping, survey and logistic support. The smaller craft of the RAN, Fairmiles, HDMLs and other motor launches, also played an important role in patrol work, convoy escorts, hydrographic surveys and clandestine operations. Supporting these ships were a number of logistics and other specialist ships that ensured the Allied ground and air forces had the required equipment and support to conduct and sustain operations in a very hostile environment. Had the Allies been unable secure the sea lines of communications the final outcome in the jungles of New Guinea may have been very different. It was not the stalwart efforts of the Australian and US ground forces alone, but the combination with the maritime interdiction campaign against Japanese supply lines, amphibious movements to outflank and bypass defensive positions, and the successful convoying of ‘troopers, beans and bullets in greater and greater numbers’ that forced the Imperial Japanese forces back from Port Moresby to their final defeat

[QUOTE=Disco44;1228417]Further on I think this is a good all round coverage....Still not able to locate my reference book..so I now think that Lae instead of Rabual should have been quoted by me.

That would be correct, Lae was a flow on from PM and the Kadoka trail.

With Rabual covered from the west and the south, air superiority. Rabual was cut off. The landings on new Britton were to force the Japanese back behind there defenses. Australia and Australians back then felt a high moral duty towards the Natives. Not only to protect them from the Japanese and the native tribes who aligned themselves with the Japanese but things like. An example on new Ireland, where the cost watcher requested that the Japanese cat house be bombed as a high Value target to save the naves from witnessing such non Christian acts. This was done so daily for the next 3 days (overkill) and was re bombed every time the Japanese tried to relocate such services.
New Briton just could not be invaded by the Australians the opposite was unthinkable. How ever an invasion of rabaul its self would have involved an attack against 85-90 thousand Japanese in fortified positions. Containment became the policy. Even the invasion of new Ireland was called off as being unnecessary.

Lae is where the infamous pistol Pete story comes from. Finally taken out by Fijian solders who brought the breach bloc back with them ( along with a lot of ears)

First aircraft in to Lae was RNZAF squadron 25 flying SBDs, landing while the runway was still under fire ( well one end of it was) and overnight on Green island I think. Green Island was taken by the NZ 3rd division.
I was lucky to meet and get to know one of the surviving navigators/ gunners from 25 squadron, when asked is only comment about Lae was “sporting”